

### Week 3 Notes: Hegel's *Introduction*

Start by talking about the structure of the book, and the different topics addressed in different parts.

Also something on the circumstances of its composition.

(Again, recommend Terry Pinkard's *Hegel: A Biography*.)

The fact that the original title was *The Science of the Experience of Consciousness* should be mentioned. This can be in connection with the account of the structure of the book, and the conjecture that Hegel changed his mind once he had finished chapters 1-5, and added the second half of the book, which he had not initially planned. (Mention the issue of whether or not he *intended* to write the book he did, possibly with the relevant quotations from him. "Poetaster")

John thinks that in these first 3 chapters I've "lost sight of the fact that the *Introduction* is an introduction to the book it is an introduction to," because the *Introduction* is really and evidently concerned with the evolution of "shapes of consciousness" (really, *self-consciousness*), which are constellations of *ways of understanding* what one is doing in knowing and acting.

On the contrary, I think I paid *too much* attention to that, and was too interested in finding more features of the book it was an introduction to in the *Introduction*.

I'll basically be breaking the 16 (not 18, as I mistakenly said last time) 'graphs into 4 parts:

Part 1: 'Medium' and 'Instrument' antirepresentationalist (anti-2-stage picture) diatribe

Part 2: Methodological explanation of hermeneutic strategy of "semantic descent."

Part 3: Experience of error. Temporal-historical internalization of appearance/reality distinction.

Part 4: Change of (I say: status of) object known when knowing changes.

Part 2 is a methodological interlude between discussion of texts in the rest of the session.

#### **Part 1. The knowing as "medium" or "instrument" argument, against two-stage representational pictures of knowledge.**

Claim is that such an *epistemology* rules out knowledge on *semantic* grounds.

**This is the argument against starting with independently intelligible representeds and representings, and "bolting them together."**

**Starting with [82]-[84] we get the elaboration of *metaconcepts* from *within* consciousness i.e. as poles of the intentional nexus, but seen from the *inside*, not a view from "sideways on."**

The argument is here (as rehearsed in the handout):

1. Knowledge...tends to be regarded as the instrument with which one takes hold of the absolute or as the medium through which one discovers it. [PG §73]
2. [I]f knowledge is the instrument to take hold of the absolute essence, one is immediately reminded that the application of an instrument to a thing does not leave the thing as it is, but brings about a shaping and alteration of it. Or, if knowledge is not an instrument for our activity, but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive this truth as it is in itself, but as it is in and through this medium. In both cases we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its own end; or, rather, the absurdity lies in our making use of any means at all. [PG§73]
3. [This model]...presupposes notions *about knowledge* as an instrument and a medium, and also the notion that there is a *difference between ourselves and this knowledge*; but above all, it presupposes that the absolute *stands on one side* and that *knowledge*, though it is *on the other side*, for itself and separated from the absolute, is nevertheless something real. Hence it assumes that knowledge may be true despite its presupposition that knowledge is outside the absolute and therewith outside the truth as well. By taking this position, what calls itself the fear of error reveals itself as a fear of the truth. [PG §74]
4. Descartes's *two-stage*, representational story sharply distinguishes between two kinds of things, based on their intrinsic intelligibility. Some things, paradigmatically physical, material, extended things, can by their nature only be known by being *represented*. Other things, the contents of our own minds, are by nature *representings* and are known in another way entirely. They are known *immediately*, not by being represented, but just by being *had*. They are intrinsically intelligible, in that their mere matter-of-factual occurrence counts as knowing or understanding something. Things that are by nature knowable only as represented are not in this sense intrinsically intelligible. Their occurrence does not entail that anyone knows or understands anything.
5. The gulf, the "difference," "separation," the two "sides" of one divide separating appearance and reality, knowing and the known, that he complains about is this gulf of intelligibility. His critical claim is that any theory of this form is doomed to yield skeptical results.
6. Kant shares with Descartes the two-stage representational structure, but does not take over the idea that our relation to our own representations is one of immediate awareness. His view still falls within the range of Hegel's criticisms, however, because he maintains the differential intelligibility of representings and representeds.
7. Kant has a new model of intelligibility: to be intelligible is to have a content articulated by *concepts*.

8. Hegel learned from Kant that the soft underbelly of *epistemological* theories is the *semantics* they implicitly incorporate and depend upon. And he thinks that two-stage representational theories committed to the strong differential intelligibility of representings and what they represent *semantically* preclude genuine knowledge of those represented.

9. The “Genuine Knowledge Condition” (GKC): Epistemological theories must not be committed to a semantics—in particular, a theory of representation—that rules out as unintelligible the very possibility of knowing how things really are (“genuine” knowledge). [End of rehearsal]

Form of the argument is:

We don’t want a *semantic* picture that makes the very possibility of genuine knowledge epistemologically in principle unintelligible.

That seems a reasonable enough demand. The question is how, exactly, to characterize semantic pictures that have that consequence.

It is *not* all *representational* pictures, at least in the sense of semantic stories that allow that (graspable) conceptual contents have a representational dimension.

It *is* semantic stories that see representings as immediately intelligible and represented as *in principle not*. [But is this quite right yet, in view of the translation argument below?]

Key to (1) is:

Boundary between conceptual/nonconceptual is boundary between what can be grasped = **understood *immediately*, in the sense of not *representationally***, i.e. by having to be represented (the representing of it being the *mediation*, the intermediary), and what can only be grasped = understood by being represented. If one thinks of representings as graspable, and represented as not, except by being represented, then one is a patsy for H’s argument. But the representational picture *essentially* requires this distinction. For if (some) representings are *not immediately* graspable, then there is an infinite regress, of knowing represented only by representings of them, which in turn are only knowable by representings of them.

This is the key analysis: representational picture *essentially* (on pain of an infinite regress) requires a distinction of *intelligibility* between (at least some) representings and represented. We are just using “conceptual” as a label for that difference—following Kant. For the empiricist tradition he inherited did not explicitly concern itself with this issue. Kant, with his doctrine of the Understanding as the faculty of concepts, introduced this thought.

But H is arguing that doing so *inevitably* drove him to a picture of the ultimate represented as *Dinge an sich*, as themselves, *as such*, as *unintelligible*. And this, he claims, means that *genuine knowledge* is also ruled out, on *semantic* grounds.

We can see how the nonpsychological conception of the conceptual (in terms of relations of material incompatibility and consequence) and bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism is a responsive answer to this challenge.

But does this *argument* about the picture of knowing as a medium or instrument show too much? Suppose I have a text in Finnish, which I do not understand.

I run it through Google translate, which *only* maps the words and verb-forms onto English, but it produces something intelligible to me.

That program, implementing the Finnish→English mapping, is the “instrument” or “medium.” It *does* alter what it operates on, and does not produce the “truth” (text) as it is in itself, but only as it is presented through this medium. Yet the *content* has been preserved.

Hegel will say that this is a case where both represented and representing are already in conceptual shape, just as his solution will have things.

True. But the “instrument” or “medium” *did* transform what is *not* intelligible (to me) into what *is* intelligible (to me). And it did not, we may suppose, substantially falsify it in doing so.

It seems that if H’s argument were good, it should rule out this case, too.

I’m inclined to think this shows that the argument *does* claim too much. It is OK at most as providing *motivation* for wanting to understand what is known as well as the knowing of it as “in conceptual shape” or however we want to pick out what is “intelligible.”

The Finnish sample *was* conceptually contentful, and the “transformation” was just of two forms of one content, as Hegel insists. But the argument *looks* to be claiming that the mere fact that the “instrument” or “medium” (here, Google translate) *alters* what it operates on shows that it *falsifies* it in a way that makes the knowledge that results not genuine. And that does not follow simply from the fact of *alteration*. For translation of the conceptual in one form into another form *need not* falsify the content.

Hegel’s own solution (meine Meinung nach) is of precisely this translational form:  
Bimodal, hylomorphic conceptual realism.

So long as we think of both ends of the relation as “in conceptual form” we are OK.  
A practical proxy for that theoretical status is that it is *translation* that relates the two.

The question that remains hanging is: what is this difference, between translation (preservation of conceptual content) and *all* other relations? How can we specify *it*, that relation of translation, so as to make this argument without begging the question.

To assume that there is such a difference, hence a methodological difference between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, without further argument, might be thought question-begging in the context of this sort of argument.

Hegel’s reply will be that he will make out the difference in what follows: in the theory of normativity (which for him, as for Kant, is specifically *conceptual* normativity).

The crucial distinction is between *explicitation*, *expressing*, explicitly, what is already *implicit* (out there: Jenseits), and *representing* one thing with another.

One of Hegel’s central tasks in the rest of the book is to show:

- a) How to understand the relation between the objective world we think about and act in and on (at once the cause of sense and goal of intellect) and our cognitive grasp of it and

practical grasp on it in thought in *expressive* terms, of making *explicit* what is *implicit*.  
The beginning of that is bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism.

b) In those same *expressive* terms, to explain the *representational* dimension of concepts.

## Part 2. Semantic Descent/Ascent

- Kant, invents/discovers a new kind of concept:

In addition to concepts whose expressive job is to describe and explain empirical goings-on, there are concepts whose expressive job is to *make explicit the framework* that makes it possible to describe and explain empirical goings on. Central among these are what are

- What Sellars made of Carnap.
- Applying that back to Kant, and seeing Hegel as taking up the metalinguistic stance.
- Understanding metalevel in terms of what it says about the object level.

The objection to accounts that see conceptually articulated representings presenting an objective world that is not conceptually articulated, that understand understanding as *conceptualizing*, in the sense of putting into conceptual shape what is not already in conceptual shape (rather than being a distinctive kind of awareness of the conceptual articulation of things) is criticizing a class of views (including Descartes's and Kant's) at the metalevel. The criticism is conducted at the metaconceptual level because it is directed at a way of conceiving the conceptual: as a feature of our knowing but not of what is there to be known. **This metaconceptual character of the opening argument motivates looking at metalevel conceptions.** And that motivates looking at the relations between concepts at the metalevel and those at the ground level. That opens up the basic distinction of “Sketch...”—though not yet the two critical points about how the two sorts of concepts are and are not alike.

explicitly connect all this with the rationale for the hermeneutic strategy of semantic descent.

This class is an opportunity to do that.

Telling this story in the vicinity of the hermeneutic strategy of semantic descent (which originates in Sellars's flash of insight about the philosophical significance of the “new way of words”: understanding Carnap's strategy of diagnosing “covertly metalinguistic” expressions, such as ‘triangularity’ as a way of working out Kant's notion of categories: framework-explicating concepts) should be a principal theme of the first half of the class (after the discussion and diagnosis of what is wrong with two-stage representational pictures—which is what motivates the idea that “the conceptual has no outer boundary”).

Include the trajectory that starts with Sellars's insight that Carnap is using the notion of metalinguistic concepts to do essentially the same work that Kant is using the notion of categories (pure concepts of the Understanding) to do.

I read this back into Hegel and Kant.

In particular, because Hegel sees that the conceptual-discursive (“discursive” for Kant *means* “of or pertaining to concepts”, discursive practice is concept-*using* practice) as essentially *linguistic* (part of what makes it amenable to *change*, in a way the thought of “rational capacities” is not evidently historical—this is a point from Herder).

This is a pivotal move in my reading.

**For *if* and *insofar as* speculative-logical-philosophical concepts *are* metalinguistic, it makes sense to think about what they let us say about ground-level concept use.**

So at least keeping both sets of books makes sense:

- a) How do the metaconcepts evolve and develop (and subject to what forces and processes)?
- b) What do they let us/make us say about the use of ground-level empirical and practical concepts—and how *they* evolve and develop (and subject to what forces and processes)?

A further consequence is that **the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*** as Hegel uses those Kantian terms shows up as ***metacategorical*, hence *metametalinguistic***: as two forms our metaconcepts can take.

**This view that Hegel’s speculative concepts are metalinguistic depends on a *much* broader notion of the metalinguistic than, for instance, Carnap or Tarski had.** (They were generalizing from Gödel numbers: using numbers as names of sentences.) **It depends not on *mentioning* linguistic expressions, but more broadly, on *making explicit* what is *implicit* in the use of some vocabulary.**

I think there are three main themes to pick out from the *Introduction*:

1. Criticism of two-stage representational model. (Which will in fact be responded to by all three stages of Absolute Idealism, but that is not much more than foreshadowed here.)
2. The key to another approach is the experience of error.
3. The nature of the “second, new, true, object” is the key to the notion of recollective rationality that will be the answer.

My bold claim is that this view about the *metaconcepts* that are “shapes of (self-)consciousness is *semantic descent*: to understand what he is saying in (1), (2), and (3) in terms of how those notions apply to *ground level* empirical (and practical) concepts, *to begin with*—and only later how they apply (insofar as they apply) to the philosophical-logical-speculative *metaconcepts* (“shapes of (self-)consciousness”) that are the official topic of the *PG*.

Here it is important to **explain semantic descent as a *hermeneutic policy-strategy***, in relation to my “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading”, and in particular, the two distinctions between determinate (ground level) and speculative (meta-)concepts retailed there (ways H claims they are alike and ways he claims they are different, being only half right in both cases).

Need to discuss the “Sketch...” treatment of the two kinds of concepts in order for us to read both

- a) the experience of error (as the path to truth re belief through determination of meaning), in Part 3, and
- b) the nature and the significance of the “emergence of the second, new, true object”, with a change in the knowing also changing what is known, by changing its status *to* consciousness (which is set up in the discussion of *in/for/to* consciousness in Part 3), in Part 4,

at *both* levels. **My principal hermeneutic innovation here is adding discussion of how these considerations apply at the ground level—not, as McD thinks, *instead of the metalevel, metaconceptual reading, but in addition to it—as a way of discussing the development at the metalevel.*** (Granted, this is not the impression I give in the 3 chapters that grew out of my 2011 Munich lectures, which are devoted to articulating the new approach, and do not sufficiently make explicit that I accept that Hegel is *principally* talking about the metalevel. I want to emphasize how remarkable it is that the text *bears* the ground-level reading *as well as the metalevel*—“shapes of (self-)consciousness” discussion of the progress of the *PG*, which is the *only* level that has traditionally been appreciated.) The “Sketch...” considerations offer the raw materials for a compare-and-contrast of these two levels, together with *one* (two-part) critical suggestion for how to resolve the disagreements, what to endorse here. So this discussion is essential to set up *both* of the later two parts, 3 and 4.

Notes from “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading...”:

1. Compare and contrast Hegel’s views about
  - a) ordinary *determinate* empirical concepts with his views about
  - b) what he calls “form determinations of the Concept”: logical, philosophical, and speculative concepts.
2. The relation between the two categories is an *expressive* one. To be a *logical* concept, for Hegel, is to be a metaconcept: to play the distinctive expressive role of making explicit general features of the use and content of ordinary, *nonlogical* (‘determinate’) concepts
3. Two claims about determinate empirical concepts:
  - a) The process whereby immediacy is gradually and incompletely incorporated in the thoroughly mediated—that is, inferentially articulated—form of determinate-but-still-determinable concepts. That is the process whereby determinate conceptual norms are at once instituted and applied in judgments and actions. It includes a retrospective phase that is a recapitulation as rational reconstruction of the first sort of process, which displays it as expressively progressive, as the gradual emerging into explicitness of a determinate conceptual content that can then be seen retrospectively as having been all along implicit in the tradition of applying and assessing applications of it. Hegel’s term for this sort of process is ‘*Erinnerung*’: recollection.
  - b) This is the process by which contingency is given the form of necessity, that is, a *normative* conceptual form—the process by which sensuous immediacy is mediated and incorporated in the content of concepts (attitudes and statuses).
    - i. Kant takes it that the way in which sensuous immediacy is a kind of matter that resists *dissolving* in conceptual form is the ***conceptual inexhaustibility of sensuous immediacy***. Conceptually synthesizing a sensuous manifold by making judgments is an infinite, incompletable task.
    - ii. Hegel takes the recalcitrance to conceptualization of sensuous immediacy to be manifested rather **in the in-principle instability of any constellation of determinate empirical concepts**. By applying those concepts *correctly*,



according to the norms that govern their use, we will *always* eventually be led to commitments that are *incompatible* by those same norms (contents). That normatively obliges us to *change* our attitudes and (so) statuses, including the contents or meanings expressed by our terms. This is the very process that shows up retrospectively as (further) *determining* the empirical contents of those concepts, according to a rational *recollection* of it. (Recall here my remarks last time about “determining” as *making* and *finding*, and about recollection as a distinctive kind of making that is (for itself) a finding.)

“For anything to be finite is just to suppress itself and put itself aside...everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient...All things—that is, the finite world as such—are doomed.” [EL§81]. On such a conception, the inexhaustible richness of empirical particularity essentially manifests itself in the *transformation, alteration, and development* of determinate concepts that is the process of experience.

On this reading, when Hegel says of the concrete that “the true, thus inwardly determinate, has the urge to develop,” Berlin Introduction (1820) to the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (p. 20 [32]) and that “The Understanding, in its pigeon-holing process, keeps the necessity and the Notion of the content to itself—all that constitutes the concreteness, the actuality, the living movement of the reality which it arranges,” [PG M53] he means that *no* concepts with fixed, determinate boundaries can capture how things are in a way that will not turn out to require eventual revision.

This view of Hegel’s is a prime manifestation of **his strategy of focusing on the *change of meaning* that goes hand-in-hand with any *change of belief*—according to good Quinean doctrine. The view of beliefs as built on top of antecedently settled fixed meanings (which Kant shares) is a semantic expression of the *traditional* commitment to the *status-dependence of normative attitudes*. Here meanings are the norms and beliefs are the attitudes. Hegel’s focus on change of meaning is a semantic expression of the *modern* commitment to the *attitude-dependence of normative statuses*—the way in which changing our beliefs necessitates changing our meanings.** Note that Quine himself does not draw the radical conclusion Hegel does from the equipollence of change of meaning and change of belief. He is too steeped in the empiricist tradition to make the change from understanding the contribution of sensuous immediacy in terms of conceptual *inexhaustibility* to conceptual *instability*.

This shift is the move from metacategories (that is, metametaconcepts) of *Verstand* to those of *Vernunft*.

4. Hegel thinks that his *Vernunft* account of the *metaphysics* of semantics has important consequences for the *epistemology* of semantics—that is, for how we think about what it is to *grasp, convey, or communicate* conceptual contents.

a) For determinate conceptual contents as Hegel conceives them **cannot be specified or conveyed by definitions of the sort Kant deploys throughout his work:** verbal formulations distinguishing the concept from all others by a set of necessary and sufficient marks (this is Kant’s definition of ‘definition’). As a rough example for a substantive concept, he offers a definition of virtue: a readiness in lawful actions that are done freely, combined with moral strength in pursuit of these with struggle against obstacles.<sup>1</sup>

Hegel’s inferential holism and his temporal perspectivalism about the sense in which ground-level empirical concepts are *determinate* (his *Vernunft* view of the process of *determining* them) rule out such definitions. They could at most be snapshots, correctly but only temporarily codifying a time-slice of a necessarily evolving concept.

b) Rather, as construed by *Vernunft*, **the proper and only adequate form of a specification of the content of a determinate empirical concept is not a definition, but a recollection.** Unlike definitions, recollections take the form of *narratives*. These rationally recreate a history of uses of the concept that are analogous to prior decisions that are treated as precedents by judges (in the model I introduced last week). Together the rehearsed uses make explicit the implicit boundaries of the concept, and are visible as determining its content, just as a judge’s rationale for her decision does.

This is Hegel’s own invariant procedure when discussing the concepts characteristic of art and religion, or in his *Realphilosophie* generally.

5. I’ve been talking about Hegel’s views on determinate empirical concepts:

- i. They are in principle unstable and ever-evolving.
- ii. Their content can only be made explicit by a recollective narrative (not a definition).

What about the other kind of concept, the categorial concepts, the framework-explicating philosophical, logical, or speculative (a translation common in English versions of Hegel for his “begreifende”) concepts—including the “form determinations of the Concept” with which the *Science of Logic* is principally concerned?

Hegel thinks that determinate and logical-categorial concepts are like each other in one of these respects and different from one another in the other respect.

- They are **alike** in that their contents can only be made explicit by a recollective narrative, not a definition. That is precisely what Hegel does for his own terminology for articulating the “shapes of consciousness”—for instance in one way, in the *Phenomenology*, and in another in the *Science of Logic*.
- They are **different** in that Hegel thinks there can be (and more or less is, in *the* (not his) System) a final, fully adequate set of philosophical concepts articulating self-consciousness, making explicit what we are doing in applying concepts empirically and practically.

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<sup>1</sup> This definition of definition is offered in each of the versions of his *Logic* that we have. See for instance the Dohna-Wundlacken *Logic*, p. 489 in Kant’s *Lectures on Logic* J. Michael Young (ed., trans.), [Cambridge U. Press 1992]. The definition of virtue is at pp. 464-465.

I reject these claims. I just think Hegel was wrong on both counts.

I understand Hegel's philosophical concepts as having a characteristic expressive role that is quite different from that of ordinary, nonphilosophical concepts. Their job is not to make explicit how the *world* is (to subserve a function of consciousness) but rather to make explicit the *process* of making explicit how the world is (to enable and embody a kind of *self*-consciousness). That distinctive categorial expressive role gives us another way of conveying the content of the expressions in Hegel's metavocabulary: explain what features of discursive practice they make explicit. Nothing analogous is true of determinate concepts, because there is no further discursive practice for which their use serves as a metavocabulary.

And

[for the other point: no final, complete metavocabulary. Can always find new features of discursive practice to articulate.]

Experience of error works at both levels, so long as at both levels applying the concepts *correctly* inevitably leads to conflict = incompatibility by one's own lights. In metacase, this means *any* conception shows itself not to be "Das System" if it *does* lead to contradiction. But then one could only know that wd never happen if one knew one had considered all alternatives, and that the last alternative must be conflict free.

Critical thought is: We can know neither.

### **Part 3. The Experience of Error. What things are *in* themselves vs. what they are *for* consciousness as something *to* consciousness. Desire and protoconsciousness**

I'm going to talk about this under three headings:

- a) (Somewhat) close to the text, which starts with the distinction between what things are in themselves and what they are for consciousness,
- b) The (proto-)consciousness of desiring beings (from beginning of Ch. IV of *PG*, Ch. 8 of *ST*).
- c) The sophisticated and hard to understand account of this at the end of the *Introduction*, in terms of the change of object consequent on change of conception (unintelligible if thought of in terms of represented changing when representing changes). The emergence of the “second, new, true object”: the status of the previous commitment changing from endorsed to not endorsed, from being *to* consciousness what things are *in* themselves to being *to* consciousness only what they are *for* consciousness, i.e. from being *to* consciousness *reality* to being *to* consciousness *appearance*.

Recall from first session: **instead of bolting together representeds and representings, Hegel wants to understand these as functional roles dissected out of a unified intentional nexus. The account of how we can understand things being *to* consciousness what things are *in* themselves, and *to* consciousness what things are *for* consciousness, in terms of the experience of error, thought of as a 3-stage, temporally extended historical process, is his response.**

This is what the final (*vernunftlich*) form of metaconcepts will let us say and see.

But it is *also* the process by which speculative metaconcepts themselves evolve, develop, and have *their* distinctive, framework-explicating contents determined.

This line of thought is how Hegel *schematizes his categories*. It is how he sees them (his speculative, philosophical metaconcepts, such as what things are for consciousness and what they are in themselves—both statuses *to* consciousness) as essentially *temporally* articulated, as to be understood in terms of how they are rooted in the experience of change (encompassing the discovery and response to cognitive *error*) and so are essentially *historical* in character. This feature of Hegel's *Introduction* looms large in Heidegger's reading of it. (The Dove translation appeared with the translation of this seminar of Heidegger's, under the title *Hegel's Concept of Experience*), which comes from the same middle period as his Kant book and shares its focus on temporality.)

This line of thought is then the background to my reading of the account of the *experience of error* in the *Introduction* as inviting us to think about the process that drives the development of ground-level concepts as the *model* for the process that drives the development of metalevel concepts.

It is an added benefit to this reading that it lets us connect to the discussion in Ch. 4 of how normative self-consciousness develops out of animal desire. For the essence of *orectic* (proto)*consciousness*, the reason it is the basis on which we can eventually understand the distinction (taken as just given in the *Introduction*) between what things are *in themselves* and what things are *for consciousness*—as a distinction that is something *to* consciousness (that is what is given, that this distinction is always-already something *to* consciousness) *because* and *insofar as* it gives rise to the *experience of error*.

In *ST I* I do not explicitly explore, or even really remark on, this crucial connection between the story I tell about the *Introduction* and the story I tell about the origins of practical protoconsciousness (and, eventually, when suitably socialized, norms) in desires. [This is for Part 3. 9/10]

The experience of error, as source of the distinction between appearance and reality.

Save Sellars's parable of the toy concept of acid for the discussion of the experience of error in Week 3 (in response to the criticism of two-stage representational explanatory strategies).

This model offers an account of how we learn more about what really follows from something's being copper, and what is really evidence for or against it.

The experience of error as the origin of the distinction, *to* consciousness, between what things are *in themselves* and what they are *for* consciousness. The nature of biological desire (3 phases, rather than the 2 of behavioristic stimulus/response, SR) as the origin of this, which is taken for granted in the *Introduction*.

Foreshadow: from desire (hence error) to norms and cognition.

1. What we must understand, then, is the sense in which, as Hegel says, which "consciousness provides itself with its own standard," how "in what consciousness within its own self designates as the *in-itself* or the true, we have the standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure its knowledge." [PG §84] How is it that: "the difference between the *in-itself* and the *for-itself* is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is *to it* the *in-itself*, but the knowledge or the being of the object for consciousness is *to it* still another moment." [PG §85]

2. **What Hegel tells us is something *to* consciousness (using the dative "ihm") is just the distinction between what things are *for* consciousness and what they are *in* themselves.** I take it that what something is *for* consciousness is the content of a judgment: something that is *explicit*. By contrast, what things are *to* consciousness is a functional matter of how they are *implicitly* taken or practically treated by consciousness.

3. **Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth.** [PG §85]

4. Hegel's term for the process by which new commitments are integrated into a constellation of old ones is 'experience' (Erfahrung).
5. In the experience of error the subject ("consciousness"): ...is consciousness of what to it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of this truth. Since both are *for consciousness*, consciousness itself is their comparison; whether its knowledge of the object corresponds or fails to correspond with this object will be a matter *for consciousness itself*. [PG §85]
6. Recall the crucial distinction, which Hegel marks grammatically, as was pointed out in Lecture II, between what things are *implicitly*, "to" consciousness ["ihm"] and what they are *explicitly*, "for" consciousness.
7. Something is to it the in-itself, but the knowledge or the being of the object for consciousness is to it still another moment. It is upon this differentiation, which exists and is present at hand, that the examination [Prüfung] is grounded. And if, in this comparison, the two moments do not correspond, then it seems that consciousness will have to alter its knowledge in order to bring it into accord with the object. [PG §85]

#### **Part 4. The emergence of appearance as transformation of the object known (from noumenon to phenomenon) as a form of *self*-consciousness.**

8. In the alteration of the knowledge, however, the object itself becomes to consciousness something which has in fact been altered as well. For the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object: with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes an other, since it was an essential part of this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what had been to it the *in-itself* is not in itself, or, what was *in itself* was so only for *consciousness*. When therefore consciousness finds its knowledge not corresponding with its object, the object itself will also give way. In other words, the standard [Maßstab] of the examination is changed if that whose standard it was supposed to be fails to endure the course of the examination. Thus the examination is not only an examination of knowledge, but also of the standard used in the examination itself. [PG §85]

9. This *dialectical* movement, which consciousness exercises on its self—on its knowledge as well as its object—is, *in so far as the new, true object emerges to consciousness* as the result of it, precisely that which is called *experience*. [PG §86]

10. Consciousness knows *something*, and this object is the essence or the *in-itself*. But this object is also the in-itself for consciousness; and hence the ambiguity of this truth comes into play. We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first *in-itself* and the second is the *being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*. The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into its self, a representation, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. But, as already indicated, the first object comes to be altered for consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is the *in-itself only for it*. And therefore it follows that this, the *being-for-consciousness of this in-itself*, is the true, which is to say that this true is the *essence* or consciousness' new *object*. This new object contains the annihilation of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object. [PG §86]

11. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what had been to it the *in-itself* is not in itself, or, what was *in itself* was so only for *consciousness*. [PG §85]

12. What the subject discovers is that what it had taken to express the way things really are (the stick is bent), actually only expresses an appearance. The role the bent-stick representation plays for consciousness, what it is to consciousness, has changed. It “becomes to consciousness an object which is the in-itself only for it.” The “new, true object” is the bent-stick representation revealed *as erroneous*, as a *misrepresentation* of what is now *to* the subject the way things really are: a straight stick. This representing is “true” not in the sense of representing how things really are, but in the sense that what is now to consciousness is what *it* really is: a

mere appearance, a misrepresenting. That is why “This new object contains the annihilation of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object.”

13. In this presentation of the course of experience, there is a moment in virtue of which it does not seem to be in agreement with the ordinary use of the term “experience.” This moment is the transition from the first object and the knowledge of that object to the other object. Although it is said that the experience is made in *this other object*, here the transition has been presented in such a way that the knowledge of the first object, or the being-for-consciousness of the first in-itself, is seen to become the second object itself. By contrast, it usually seems that we somehow discover another object in a manner quite accidental and extraneous, and that we experience *in it* the untruth of our first Concept. **What would fall to us, on this ordinary view of experience, is therefore simply the pure *apprehension of* what exists in and for itself. From the viewpoint of the present investigation, however, the new object shows itself as having come into being through an *inversion of consciousness* itself.** [PG §87]

14. This way of observing the subject matter is our contribution; it does not exist for the consciousness which we observe. But when viewed in this way the sequence of experiences constituted by consciousness is raised to the level of a scientific progression. [PG §87]

15. This new object contains the nothingness [Nichtigkeit] of the first, it is what experience has made of it. [PG §86]

The nature of the “second, new, true, object” is the key to the notion of recollective rationality that will be the answer. This puzzling text (the object changing when the knowing changes) as the puzzle to which this is the answer. Becoming aware of appearance *as* appearance: the passing away that does not pass away. This is a (the?) key new form of self-consciousness, a crucial boundary being crossed. But H redescribes it.

**Error as the path to truth by further determining content (modern insight into effect of change of belief on meaning—that is, of *attitude on norm*. The task of getting to truths is the same as the path that improves meanings. Think principally (and this is what is new, by Hegel) in terms of the latter as an analysis of the former (progressive change of meaning is approach to truth).** This works at *both* levels, meta- and ground-level.

Approaching increasing truth of beliefs by increasing the amount of immediacy-contingency one incorporates into mediated-necessity form, into conceptual norms, by further determining meaning is an instance and application of the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. It is taking a somewhat inegalitarian attitude toward Quine’s insight in TDE. (H is officially even-handed, but in fact emphasizes the change-of-meaning—determination of meaning—aspect, over the traditional truth one.)

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It is worth pointing out somewhere (in connection with this change-of-meaning as modern attitude-dependence of norms and change-of-belief, truth, as traditional norm-



dependence of attitudes) how *rational choice theory* and *Bayesian epistemology* cannot be the full story about rationality in the sense of what is a reason for and against what. For they presuppose *semantics*, the *meanings* of the options/outcomes (Don't confuse these, as the stupid claim that "failure is not an option!" does.) and the propositions to which credences and conditional probabilities are assigned. But what is a reason for and against what is an essential element in the functional determination of meanings. So there must be a notion of reason-for and reason-against that is *not* to be analyzed as in rational choice theory or Bayesian epistemology, but which is what matters for semantics, for the account of meaning.